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Abstract
In a seminal paper, Lin and Reiter introduced a model-
theoretic deﬁnition for the progression of the initial knowl-
edge base of a basic action theory. This deﬁnition comes
with a strong negative result, namely that for certain kinds of
action theories, ﬁrst-order logic is not expressive enough to
correctly characterize this form of progression, and second-
order axioms are necessary. However, Lin and Reiter also
considered an alternative deﬁnition for progression which is
always ﬁrst-order deﬁnable. They conjectured that this alter-
native deﬁnition is incorrect in the sense that the progressed
theory is too weak and may sometimes lose information. This
conjecture, and the status of ﬁrst-order deﬁnable progression,
has remained open since then. In this paper we present two
signiﬁcant results about this alternative deﬁnition of progres-
sion. First, we prove the Lin and Reiter conjecture by pre-
senting a case where the progressed theory indeed does lose
information. Second, we prove that the alternative deﬁnition
is nonetheless correct for reasoning about a large class of sen-
tences, including some that quantify over situations. In this
case the alternative deﬁnition is a preferred option due to its
simplicity and the fact that it is always ﬁrst-order.
Introduction
The situation calculus is a logical language that is specially
designed for reasoning about action and change (McCarthy
& Hayes 1969). A basic action theory is a logical theory in
the situation calculus that describes what holds initially in
the world as well as how the world evolves under the effects
of actions. An example of a basic action theory is one that
captures the dynamics of a board game: part of the theory,
the initial knowledge base, describes the initial positions of
the pieces on the board, and the rest of the theory charac-
terize the legal moves of the game and the effects (and non-
effects) of performing those moves.
A fundamental problem in reasoning about action and
change is to determine whether or not some condition holds
after a given sequence of actions has been performed. In
other words, we start in an initial situation S0, we perform a
sequence of actions  taking us to a new situation S, and
we wish to know if the condition holds in S. There are in
fact two versions of this problem. The special case where
Copyright c  2008, American Association for Artiﬁcial Intelli-
gence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
the condition only refers to S is called the (simple) projec-
tion problem (Reiter 2001). For example, we might want to
know if a game piece is at a certain location after move .
The more general case is where the condition may refer to
situations in the future of S. For example, we might want
to know if a game piece can ever get to a certain location
after move . This sort of reasoning, which we will call
the generalized projection problem, is a prerequisite to other
forms of reasoning in dynamic domains such as planning
and high-level program execution (Reiter 1993).
The simple projection problem can be solved by regres-
sion or by progression (Lin 2007). Roughly speaking, re-
gression involves taking the condition about S and trans-
forming it to an equivalent one about S0 where we can use
the initial knowledge base to answer the question; progres-
sion, on the other hand, involves replacing the initial knowl-
edge base in the basic action theory by a new knowledge
base that captures the facts that hold in S.
For the generalized problem, where the condition may re-
fer to the future of S, the case is less clear. There is no re-
sult for evaluating such conditions based on regression, and
it is not clear if there is a practical deﬁnition for progression
that is logically correct for this reasoning task.
A model-theoretic deﬁnition of progression in the situa-
tioncalculusthatdoesthetrickwasﬁrstproposedbyLinand
Reiter (1997). However, their deﬁnition, which we call LR-
progression, comes with a strong negative result: for certain
kinds of basic action theories, ﬁrst-order logic is not expres-
sive enough and second-order logic is needed. Nonetheless,
their result did not preclude the possibility of other forms of
progression that could still allow us to solve the generalized
problem while remaining ﬁrst-order deﬁnable. In particular,
one possible candidate for the new knowledge base is the in-
ﬁnite set of all those ﬁrst-order sentences about S that are
entailed by the original basic action theory. We will call this
second notion of progression FO-progression.
While FO-progression clearly captures what holds in S,
it is not clear that it is sufﬁcient to characterize the future
of S, even in combination with the rest of the basic action
theory. Lin and Reiter conjectured that it was too weak. It
has been an open problem whether this conjecture is true or
false, rendering unclear also the question whether there can
be an alternative to LR-progression that solves the general-
ized problem and is ﬁrst-order deﬁnable.This paper contains two major results. First of all, we
prove the Lin and Reiter conjecture: FO-progression is in-
deed too weak for characterizing the future of S. We pro-
vide a basic action theory and a sentence about the future
of S that demonstrate this. This result (Theorem 2) further
supports the claim by Lin and Reiter that the progression of
unrestricted basic action theories cannot be formalized cor-
rectly in ﬁrst-order logic.
The second result is more positive. FO-progression was
shown by Lin and Reiter (1997) to be correct for the sim-
ple projection problem. Here we prove that it is also correct
for a much wider class of sentences including sentences of
the form “after , property  will always be true.” This re-
sult (Theorem 4) establishes that FO-progression is actually
more useful than was originally believed.
Situation calculus
The language L of the situation calculus (McCarthy &
Hayes 1969) is ﬁrst-order with equality and many-sorted,
with sorts for actions, situations, and objects (everything
else). A situation represents a world history as a sequence
of actions. The constant S0 is used to denote the initial situ-
ation where no actions have occurred. Sequences of actions
are built using the function symbol do, such that do(a;s) de-
notes the successor situation resulting from performing ac-
tion a in situation s. A relational ﬂuent is a predicate whose
lastargumentisasituation, andthuswhosevaluecanchange
from situation to situation. For the scope of this paper we do
not allow the language to include functional ﬂuents but we
note that they can be represented as relational ﬂuents with
some extra axioms. Actions need not be executable in all
situations, and the predicate Poss(a;s) states that action a is
executable in situation s. The language L also includes the
binary predicate symbol @ which provides an ordering on
situations. The atom s@s0 means that the action sequence
s0 can be obtained from the sequence s by performing one or
more actions in s. We will typically use the notation v0
as a macro for @0 _ =0.
Often we need to restrict our attention to sentences in L
that refer to a particular situation. For example, the initial
knowledge base is a ﬁnite set of sentences in L that do not
mention any situation terms except for S0. For this purpose,
for any situation term , we deﬁne L to be the subset of
L that does not mention any other situation terms except for
, does not mention Poss, and where  is not used by any
quantiﬁer (Lin & Reiter 1997). When a formula () is in
L we say that it is uniform in  (Reiter 2001). Also, we
will use L2 to denote the second-order extension of L that
only allows predicate variables that take arguments of sort
object. L2
 then denotes the second-order extension of L
by predicate variables with arguments of sort object.
We will use notation similar to (Gabaldon 2002) and
(Reiter 2001) to talk about sequences of actions and
situations that are rooted. Let  be a situation term
and  be a (possibly empty) sequence of action terms
h1;:::;ni. We use do(;) to denote the situation
do(n;do(n 1;:::do(1;):::)). We say that a situation
term  is rooted at 0 iff  is the term do(;0) for some 
(in which case, 0 v  clearly holds). Finally, we will use
S to denote the situation term do(;S0).
We will also need to restrict our attention to sentences that
refer to  and the possible futures of . We say that  is in
the future of  in , where  is a rectiﬁed sentence in L, iff
  is , or
  is rooted at some 0 in the future of  in , or
  is a variable and 8(0 v   ) or 9(0 v  ^ )
appears in , where 0 is in the future of  in .
We deﬁne L
F
 as the subset of L such that for any  2 L
F

the situation terms in  that appear as arguments of Poss or
some ﬂuent or the equality predicate are all in the future of
 in . When a sentence  is in L
F
 we say that  is about
the future of .
To see the intuition behind L
F
 ﬁrst note that the sentence
8s(S vs  (s)) is in L
F
S and expresses that (s) holds
in all situations that are rooted at S. The recursion allows
the sentence 8s(S v s  (s) ^ 9s0(s v s0 ^  (s0)) and
sentences of this form to be in L
F
S as well. In general if a
sentence is in L
F
 then its truth depends only on situations
that are in the future of .
Basic action theories
We will be dealing with a speciﬁc kind of L-theory, the so-
called basic action theories. The deﬁnition that follows is
the same as in (Reiter 2001) except that, similarly to (Lake-
meyer & Levesque 2004), Dap consists of a single action
precondition axiom for all actions instead of one separate
axiom for each action symbol. A basic action theory D has
the following form:1
D = Dap [ Dss [ Duna [ DS0 [ Dfnd
1. Dap contains a single precondition axiom for all actions
of the form Poss(a;s)  (a;s), where (a;s) is in Ls.
2. Dss is a set of successor state axioms (SSAs), one for
each ﬂuent symbol F, of the form F(~ x;do(a;s)) 
F(~ x;a;s), where F(~ x;a;s) is in Ls. SSAs charac-
terize the conditions under which the ﬂuent has a speciﬁc
value at situation do(a;s) as a function of situation s.
3. Duna is the set of unique-names axioms for actions:
A(~ x)6=A0(~ y), and A(~ x)=A(~ y)  ~ x=~ y, for each pair of
distinct action symbols A and A0.
4. DS0  LS0 describes the initial situation.
5. Dfnd is a set of domain independent foundational axioms
which formally deﬁne legal situations and @.
Regression
An important computational mechanism for reasoning about
actions is regression. A formula  is regressable iff the fol-
lowing conditions hold (Reiter 2001):2
1. every situation term in  is rooted at S0;
2.  does not quantify over situations;
1For the sake of readability we will be omitting the leading uni-
versal quantiﬁers.
2Unlike (Reiter 2001), here unrestricted Poss atoms are allowed
as a consequence of having a single axiom in Dap.3.  does not mention the predicate symbol @ and it does
not mention any equality atom built on situation terms.
Reiter introduced a regression operator that eliminates Poss
atoms in favor of their deﬁnitions as given by Dap, and re-
places ﬂuent atoms about do(;) by logically equivalent
expressions about  as given by the successor state axioms
in Dss. After repeatedly doing this transformation to a re-
gressable sentence  we get a sentence R() in LS0 such
that D j=   R(). We omit the deﬁnition of the re-
gression operation R and only state the main theorem as it
appears in (Pirri & Reiter 1999):
Theorem 1 (Pirri and Reiter). Let D be a basic action
theory and  be a regressable sentence of L. Then R() is a
sentence in LS0. Moreover, D j=  iff DS0 [ Duna j= R().
Progression
TheprogressionofD isanewtheoryD0 thatisabletoreason
correctly about all situations in the future of S. It is typical
in the literature to deﬁne DS as the progression of DS0 wrt
a ground action  and take D0 to be (D DS0) [ DS. In
other words, we want to replace DS0 in D by a suitable set
of sentences DS satisfying the following (Reiter 2001):
(I) Just as DS0 is a set of sentences in LS0, the sentences of
the new knowledge base DS should be uniform in S.
(II) D and D0 should be equivalent wrt how they describe the
situations in the future of S.
Whenever DS satisﬁes these conditions we will say that the
progression is correct.
Lin and Reiter (1997) gave a model theoretic deﬁnition
for DS that we call LR-progression. Here we review the
deﬁnition that appears in (Reiter 2001) that is more compact.
Deﬁnition 1. Let D be a basic action theory. A set of sen-
tences DS is an LR-progression of DS0 wrt to ground action
 iff the following conditions hold:
1. DS is a set of sentences in L2
S;
2. D j= (D DS0) [ DS;
3. for every model M0 of (D DS0) [ DS there is a model
M of D such that the following conditions hold:
(a) M and M0 have the same domains;
(b) M and M0 interpret all non-ﬂuent symbols that do not
take any arguments of sort situation identically;
(c) for every relational ﬂuent F, and every variable assign-
ment ,
M; j= Svs^F(~ x;s) iff M0; j= Svs^F(~ x;s);
(d) for every variable assignment ,
M; j= S v s ^ Poss(a;s) iff
M0; j= S v s ^ Poss(a;s):
By the conditions 2 and 3 in the deﬁnition it follows that for
D and (D DS0) [ DS; any model of one is indistinguish-
able from some model of the other wrt how they interpret the
situations in the future of S (Reiter 2001). Therefore LR-
progression satisﬁes the condition (II). Moreover the condi-
tion 1 says that DS is a set of second-order sentences that
are uniform in S. Therefore LR-progression also satisﬁes
the condition (I) and thus it is correct.
LR-progression comes with a strong negative result,
namely that if we restrict DS to be ﬁrst-order then an
LR-progression does not always exist (Lin & Reiter 1997).
Nonetheless, there is an alternative deﬁnition according to
which a ﬁrst-order DS always exists. The idea is to let
DS be the inﬁnite set of ﬁrst-order entailments of D in
LS (Pednault 1987). We call this second notion of pro-
gression FO-progression and to avoid confusion we will be
using FS to refer to it. We introduce the following deﬁni-
tion:3
Deﬁnition 2. Let D be a basic action theory and FS be a
set of sentences in LS. FS is an FO-progression of D wrt
to ground action  iff for all  in LS, (D DS0)[FS j= 
iff D j= .
It is clear that any FO-progression satisﬁes the condition
(I). It has been open though whether it also satisﬁes the con-
dition (II) since it was ﬁrst formulated as a problem in (Lin
& Reiter 1997). In fact, following intuitions and results
in (Peppas, Foo, & Williams 1995) Lin and Reiter conjec-
tured that there is a counter example that shows that FO-
progression does not always satisfy the property (II). Here
we state the conjecture in an equivalent way using the termi-
nology that we introduced in this paper.
Conjecture 1 (Lin and Reiter). There is a basic action the-
ory D, a ground action , and a sentence  in L
F
S such that
D j=  but (D DS0) [ FS 6j= , where DS0 is the initial
knowledge base of D, and FS is an FO-progression of DS0
wrt a.
FO-progression is not correct for L
F
S
In this section we give a proof of Conjecture 1 thus resolving
the open question whether FO-progression is correct. The
proof is based on the notion of unnamed objects that we will
be deﬁning shortly. We will present a basic action theory
D1, a ground action A, and a sentence  2 L
F
SA, for which
Conjecture 1 holds. We start by presenting D1 and the intu-
itions behind its deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3. Let L1 be the situation calculus language that
consists of a binary ﬂuent symbol F, two constant action
symbols A;B, a constant object symbol 0, and a unary func-
tion symbol n that takes an argument of sort object. Let D1
be the basic action theory of L1 that is deﬁned as follows.
 Dap consists of the sentence Poss(a;s)  true.
 Dss consists of the following sentence:
F(x;do(a;s))  a = A ^ x = 0 _
a = B ^ :F(x;s) ^ 9y(x = n(y) ^ F(y;s)):
(1)
 Duna consists of the sentence A 6= B.
 DS0 consists of the following sentences:
8a(a = A _ a = B) (2)
3Unlike (Lin & Reiter 1997) and in order to be consistent with
the idea of replacing D S0 with a new set, we insist that it is not FS
but (D   D S0) [ FS that entails the same set of  in LS as D:8x(x 6= 0  9y n(y) = x) (3)
8x8y(n(x) = n(y)  x = y) (4)
F(0;S0) ^ 8x(F(x;S0)  F(n(x);S0)) (5)
9x :F(x;S0) (6)
 Dfnd is the domain independent foundational axioms.
D1 was carefully deﬁned so that all of its models satisfy
two properties that we will take advantage in the sequel. Be-
fore we state the properties we need to introduce some no-
tation. Observe that each of the ground terms of sort object
in L1 has the form nk(0), i.e. it is constructed by a ﬁnite
number of applications of the function n to the constant 0.
Deﬁnition 4. Let GT be the set of all the ground terms of
sort object in L and M be an L-structure. For every q in the
object domain of M we will say that q is named iff there is
a term t 2 GT such that t is interpreted as q, and unnamed
otherwise. Also, we will say that M is a term structure iff
all the elements of the object domain of M are named.
The ﬁrst property of the models of D1 is due to DS0 which
can only be satisﬁed in models that have unnamed objects.
Lemma 1. No model of D1 is a term structure.
Proof Sketch: The intuition is that the sentence (5) is sat-
isﬁed only in a structure M where for all named objects q,
M;x
q j= F(x;S0), while the sentence (6) is satisﬁed only
in a structure M that has an element q0 in the object domain
such that M;x
q0 6j= F(x;S0). Therefore f(5);(6)g can only
be satisﬁed in a structure that has an unnamed object. 
The second property is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let M be a model of D1. For every action se-
quence , M;x
q j= F(x;do(;SA)) iff q is the denotation
of nk(0), where k is
 the number 0, if the last action in  is A;
 the number of B actions that appear after the last occur-
rence of action A in hA;i, otherwise.
Proof Sketch: Consider the sentence (1), the successor state
axiom for F. First note that in SA, F is false for all the
elements of the object domain except for the denotation of
0. In do(B;SA) then, F is false for all the elements of the
object domain except for the denotation of n(0). This is
because :F(x;SA)^9y(x = n(y) ^ F(y;SA)) is true only
for x = n(0) and y = 0. The formal proof is done by
induction on the length of  using a similar argument and
the fact that the sentences (3), (4) in DS0 ensure that y and
n(y) are different objects. 
We now present the sentence  2 L
F
SA that we will be
using to prove the conjecture.
Deﬁnition 5. Let  be 9x8s(SAvs  :F(x;s)).
First we show that by the two properties of D1 that we
identiﬁed earlier the following lemma holds for D1 and :
Lemma 3. D1 j= .
Proof Sketch: Consider a model M of D1. By Lemma 2 it
follows that for every situation in the future of SA there can
only be named objects for which F is true. By Lemma 1 it
follows that there exists at least one unnamed object in the
domain. Therefore there is an x such that F(x;s) can never
be true in any situation in the future of SA, which implies
that M j= 9x8s(SAvs  :F(x;s)). 
Now we will proceed to show that (D1 DS0)[F1 6j= ,
where F1 is an FO-progression of DS0 wrt A.
Deﬁnition 6. Let F1 be the set f8x(x = 0  F(x;SA));
(2); (3); (4)g:
It is not difﬁcult to show that, unlike D1, (D1 DS0)[F1 has
a term model, in particular one that has the natural numbers
as the domain for objects and interprets the constant symbol
0as the number0and the function symboln as the successor
function.
Lemma 4. There is a model of (D1 DS0) [ F1 that is a
term structure.
The important point is that even though (D1 DS0) [ F1
fails to capture a property that D1 has, namely that D1 is not
satisﬁed in any term structure, the next lemma shows that F1
is in fact an FO-progression wrt to A.
Lemma 5. F1 is an FO-progression of the initial knowledge
base of D1 wrt to ground action A.
The reason is that (D1 DS0)[F1 and D1 entail the same set
of sentences in LSA. The formal proof is long and tedious
and involves model-theoretic techniques for constructing el-
ementarily equivalent structures, such as the use of the up-
ward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem.
We now show the last lemma we need in order to prove
Conjecture 1.
Lemma 6. (D1 DS0) [ F1 6j= .
Proof Sketch: Consider the term model M of (D1 DS0)[F1
that we sketched for Lemma 4, where 0 is interpreted as the
number zero and nk(0) is interpreted as k 2 N. Note that
the property about F that is proven in Lemma 2 also holds
for all the models of (D1 DS0) [ F1. It follows that for
every x in the object domain there is a sequence of actions
after which F(x;s) becomes true, which implies that M j=
8x9s(SAvs^F(x;s)) or equivalently that M j= :. 
The next theorem establishes that the conjecture by Lin
and Reiter is indeed true and thus closes the corresponding
open question about the correctness of FO-progression.
Theorem 2. Conjecture 1 holds.
Proof. By Lemma 3, Lemma 5, and Lemma 6. 
FO-progression is correct for L
Q
S
In the previous section we showed that in the general case
FO-progression is not correct. In this section we show that it
is nonetheless correct for addressing certain non-trivial rea-
soning problems. First, we review the result by Lin and Re-
iter (1997) that FO-progression is correct for addressing the
(simple) projection problem.Lemma 7. Let D be a basic action theory and FS be an
FO-progression of DS0 wrt to ground action . Then, for
any sentence (s) 2 Ls and any situation term  that is
rooted at S, D j= () iff (D DS0) [ FS j= ().
This result can be extended using the properties of regres-
sion. First, we deﬁne the set L
R
 which is a generalization of
the set of regressable sentences.
Deﬁnition 7. A formula  is in L
R
 iff the following condi-
tions hold:
 every term of sort situation mentioned in  is rooted at ;
  does not quantify over situations;
  does not mention the predicate symbol @ and it does
not mention any equality atom built on situation terms.
L
R
S0 is exactly the set of regressable sentences while L
R
 is
the subset of it that can also be regressed down to . For
example F(do(A;S0)) ^ G(do(B;S0)) is in L
R
S0 but not in
L
R
SA, while F(do(A;S0)) ^ G(do(A;S0)) is in both.
We introduce a generalized regression operator R for
formulas in L
R
. This operator works exactly the same as
R() regressing atoms according to the precondition and
successor state axioms in D, except that it only does so until
a sentence uniform in  is obtained. Like Theorem 1, two
similar results can be obtained for R.
Corollary 1. Let D be a basic action theory and  be a
sentence in L
R
. Then, R() is a sentence in L such that
D j=  iff D j= R().
Corollary 2. Let D be a basic action theory, FS be a set
of sentences in LS, and  be a sentence in L
R
S, where 
is a ground action. Then, RS() is a sentence in LS such
that (D DS0) [ FS j=  iff FS [ Duna j= RS().
It is easy then to extend Lemma 7 and show that an FO-
progression is correct not only for reasoning about sentences
in L but also for any sentence in L
R
S.
Lemma 8. Let D be a basic action theory, FS be an FO-
progression of DS0 wrt to ground action , and  be a sen-
tence in L
R
S. Then, D j=  iff (D DS0) [ FS j= .
Proof. By Corollary 1, RS() is in LS and D j=  iff
D j= RS(). ByLemma7, thisholdsiff(D DS0)[FS j=
RS(). By Corollary 2 and since D and (D DS0) [ FS
share the same Dss, this holds iff (D DS0) [ FS j= . 
We will now show that an FO-progression is correct for
a much wider class of sentences that may also quantify over
situations. We extend L
R
 as follows.
Deﬁnition 8. Let  be a situation term. L
Q
 is the smallest
set such that the following conditions hold:
1. if (s) 2 L
R
s then () and 8s(vs  (s)) are in L
Q
;
2. if ;  2 L
Q
 then so are :,  ^  .
L
Q
 is the subset of L
F
 that restricts the quantiﬁers for situ-
ation variables to appear only in sub-formulas of the form
8s( v s  (s)), where (s) does not have free vari-
ables other than s. Consider, for instance, the set L
Q
S: The
sentence , that we used to show that FO-progression is
not correct for L
F
, is an example of a sentence not in L
Q
S:
Nonetheless L
Q
S is quite large and includes many interest-
ing cases, such as sentences expressing state invariants of
the form “after the execution of  it is ensured that (s) will
always hold” or “after the execution of  there is no way to
achieve (s)”, as well as boolean combinations of those.
Before we proceed to proving the main result of the sec-
tion we need the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let D be a basic action theory, FS be an FO-
progression of DS0 wrt ground action , and C be a set of
sentences in L. Let D0 be (D DS0) [ FS and assume that
the following holds for D;D0;C.
Let M be a model of D and M0 be a model of D0. If it
holds that for all  2 LS, M j=  iff M0 j= , then it
also holds that for all  2 C, M j=  iff M0 j= .
Then, for all  2 C, D j=  iff D0 j= .
This theorem speciﬁes a method for proving that an FO-
progression is correct for a class of sentences C. Essentially
itreducesthequestionaboutentailment (thetwotheoriesen-
tail the same set of sentences in C, provided they entail the
same set of sentences in LS) to a simpler question about
satisfaction (any two models of the theories satisfy the same
set of sentences in C, provided they satisfy the same set of
sentences in LS). The proof is long and relies on the foun-
dational result that D   Dfnd is equivalent to D wrt the en-
tailment of sentences uniform in some (Lin & Reiter 1997)
and the Compactness Theorem of ﬁrst-order logic.
So, in order to show that an FO-progression is correct for
L
Q
S it sufﬁces to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 9. Let D be a basic action theory and FS be an
FO-progression of DS0 wrt ground action . Let M be a
model of D and M0 be a model of (D DS0)[FS such that
for all  2 LS, M j=  iff M0 j= . Then, for all  2 L
Q
S,
M j=  iff M0 j= .
Proof. By induction on the construction of  2 L
Q
S. The
only interesting part is the base of the induction where we
have two cases: i)  is in L
R
S or ii)  is 8s(S v s   (s)),
where  (s) is in L
R
s. Case i) follows from Lemma 8. For
caseii)wewilluseatricktodealwiththequantiﬁcationover
situations to reduce it to case i). We prove the ()) direction
by contradiction and the other one follows similarly.
Let M j= 8s(Svs   (s)) where  (s) is in L
R
s and
suppose that M0 6j= 8s(Svs   (s)). It follows that
there is an element q of the situation domain such that
M0;s
q j= Svs ^ : (s). Since M0 satisﬁes the founda-
tional axioms Dfnd, this element q is reachable from the de-
notation of S by a ﬁnite number of applications of the func-
tion do. In particular let e1;:::;en be elements of the action
domain such that doM
0
(he1;:::;eni;SM
0
 ) = q. It follows
that M0 j= , where  is the following sentence:
9a1 9an : (do(ha1;:::;ani;S)):
By the hypothesis  (s) is in L
R
s and so  is in L
R
S. By case
i) it follows that M j= . Since M satisﬁes the foundational
axioms Dfnd, it follows that M j= 9s(Svs ^ : (s))
or equivalently M 6j= 8s(Svs   (s)) which is a
contradiction. Thus our assumption is wrong and
M0 j= 8s(Svs   (s)). Now we are ready to state and prove the main theorem of
the section, namely that FO-progression is correct for L
Q
S.
Theorem 4. Let D be a basic action theory, FS be an FO-
progression of DS0 wrt to ground action , and  be a sen-
tence in L
Q
S. Then D j=  iff (D DS0) [ FS j= .
Proof. By Theorem 3 and Lemma 9. 
Related and Future Work
Other people havelooked into deﬁnitions for the progression
of basic action theories under different assumptions. Liu and
Levesque (2005) study the special case where the domain
of discourse is ﬁxed to a countable set of named objects,
Claßen and Lakemeyer (2006) focus on the ES variant of
the situation calculus, and Thielscher (1999) deﬁnes a dual
representationforthebasicactiontheoriesbasedonstateup-
date axioms that explicitly deﬁne the direct effects of each
action. In order for the progression to remain in ﬁrst-order
a special form is assumed for the structure of the basic ac-
tion theory. This is in contrast to our line of work where
we identify a class of sentences for which a ﬁrst-order pro-
gression of an unrestricted theory is correct. A similar but
much weaker result is due to Shirazi and Amir (2005). Shi-
razi and Amir prove that for those cases that progression is
ﬁrst-order deﬁnable, their variant of progression is correct
for answering queries uniform in some situation term.
With respect to the proof for Conjecture 1, the notion of
unnamed objects is also used in a different way in (Lin &
Reiter 1997) to show that a ﬁrst-order LR-progression does
not always exist. Also, Theorem 4 shares intuitions with a
result that appears in (Savelli 2006): whenever a basic ac-
tion theory entails that there exists a situation satisfying a
condition, at least one such situation must be found within a
predetermined distance from the initial situation. The proof
of this result relies on two ideas that we also used, namely
the trick we used in the proof for Lemma 9 to deal with
the quantiﬁcation over situations, and the use of the Com-
pactness Theorem for the proof of Theorem 3. The main
difference is that we have separated the use of each of the
ideas in such way that Theorem 3 and a different trick can
be used to prove a result about progression under different
assumptions. Finally, we note that Theorem 4 and the re-
sult in (Savelli 2006) also imply corresponding results about
regression that we intend to investigate in future work.
Our future work also focuses on the following. First, we
intend to investigate when a ﬁnite FO-progression can be
found. Note that an FO-progression is not necessarily an in-
ﬁnite set. The case of F1 for the basic action D1 is such
an example. Second, we showed that an FO-progression
is not correct unless we restrict our attention to a subset of
the sentences about the future of S, namely the set L
Q
S.
Nonetheless, depending on what kind of a basic action the-
ory we consider, there are cases where FO-progression is
correct for all the sentences about the future of S. As a
special case note that when DS0 is empty, FO-progression
is correct.4 We want to identify practical cases where FO-
progression can safely be used for all reasoning tasks.
4Let FS be the empty set. D and (D D S0) [ FS coincide.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented two signiﬁcant results about the
progression of basic action theories. First, we proved a con-
jecture by Lin and Reiter and showed that an alternative def-
inition for a progressed theory loses information. Second,
we proved that this alternative deﬁnition is nonetheless cor-
rect for reasoning about a large class of sentences, including
some that quantify over situations. Moreover, we provided
a general method for proving the correctness of the alterna-
tive deﬁnition that can be used under different assumptions.
We conclude that, under practical conditions, the alternative
deﬁnition is a preferred option due to its simplicity and the
fact that it is always ﬁrst-order.
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